RE: -- No Subject --

[Jennifer K T Warner <jkw4d@cms.mail.virginia.edu>]

Are you saying that this might be grounds for some sort 
of public policy tort, because there is a third party 
effect? This is an interesting argument.  I wonder 
though, if it would fail because the third parties are 
not the public at large (as may be effected say by an 
exploding Pinto), but rather co-employees.  Would the 
other employees be third parties or a sort of pseudo-same 
party because they are in the same private 
employer-employee relationship.  I don't know, but you 
pose an interesting question.
On Thu, 17 Feb 2000 13:07:40 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time) 
Jennifer Loraine Swize <jls5ec@cms.mail.Virginia.EDU> wrote:
> Isn't anyone else tired of hearing Professor Verkerke 
> express his dejection about no e-mails on the class list?  
> (No offense, Professor.)
> 
> Well, I decided, why not throw out this thought that's been 
> on my mind.
> 
> Going back to our study of Intentional Infliction of 
> Emotional Distress, claims, there was a note after the Agis 
> case (note 1, p. 169) that made me stop and think, asking 
> why Agis has any claim since she was hired at will. (She 
> was the waitress fired for her last name beginning with 'A' 
> in a plan by the restaurant to deter thefts.) 
> 
> It does seem, at first glance, that Agis (and so many of 
> these other plaintiffs hired at will) would have no remedy 
> since she could be fired for a good, bad, or no reason.  But
> that's troublesome.
> 
> So I am wondering what you think of a possible response:
> that Agis does have a claim because her firing involved 
> more than the employer-employee relationship since the 
> employer (Howard Johnson) was using Agis' firing to get at 
> others. In other words, since Agis was being used as means, 
> the firing extended beyond the two-party relationship of 
> employer-employee and thus a remedy exists, regardless of 
> the at-will employment status.
> 
> Does that make any sense to anyone??