No Subject

[Jennifer Loraine Swize <jls5ec@cms.mail.virginia.edu>]

Isn't anyone else tired of hearing Professor Verkerke 
express his dejection about no e-mails on the class list?  
(No offense, Professor.)

Well, I decided, why not throw out this thought that's been 
on my mind.

Going back to our study of Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, claims, there was a note after the Agis 
case (note 1, p. 169) that made me stop and think, asking 
why Agis has any claim since she was hired at will. (She 
was the waitress fired for her last name beginning with 'A' 
in a plan by the restaurant to deter thefts.) 

It does seem, at first glance, that Agis (and so many of 
these other plaintiffs hired at will) would have no remedy 
since she could be fired for a good, bad, or no reason.  But
that's troublesome.

So I am wondering what you think of a possible response:
that Agis does have a claim because her firing involved 
more than the employer-employee relationship since the 
employer (Howard Johnson) was using Agis' firing to get at 
others. In other words, since Agis was being used as means, 
the firing extended beyond the two-party relationship of 
employer-employee and thus a remedy exists, regardless of 
the at-will employment status.

Does that make any sense to anyone??